ABSTRACT Inter-domain routing system (IRS) is the key infrastructure of the Internet. It is of great significance to perceive and identify the security threats of IRS for the stable operation of the Internet. Security quantification is an important part of security threat perception. The existing methods are unable to construct accurate abnormal state quantitative models because of limited data. Therefore, only the similarity between the current state and the normal state of IRC can be considered, and the types of security threats cannot be distinguished. Aiming at the above problems, this paper proposes a security measurement method based on the abnormal state modeling. By analyzing the security indicators, when IRS suffering from security events and extracting the common characteristics of the abnormal state, a qualitative model of IRS's abnormal state is established. Thus, the similarity between the current state and the specific abnormal state has been taken into consideration in measuring the security of IRS. Experiments based on SMW-4 cable fault event and Malaysian route leak event show that the highest detection and classification precision of the former are both 100%, and the highest detection and classification precision of the latter is 96% and 95.8%, respectively, which proves that the measurement results can indicate the occurrence of security threats and their types.
I. INTRODUCTION
Inter-domain routing system (IRS) is the key infrastructure of the Internet, and its secure operation guarantees reliable data delivery in the Internet. Unfortunately, IRS is vulnerable to multiple types of security threats such as cable faults, route leaks, etc., which can cause significant influence to the data communication in Internet. At present, some system security quantification methods have been proposed for perceiving these security threats, such as I-Seismograph [1] , [2] and MAF-SAM [3] . By quantifying the security of IRS, these methods can calculate the threat index of IRS to indicate the occurrence of the security threats. These methods are based on the assumption that when IRS is in normal state, the security indicators of IRS are relatively stable; when IRS suffering from security threats, the security indicators of IRS may change significantly. Therefore, by modeling the normal state of IRS and calculating the similarity between the current The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Yupeng Wang. state and the normal state of IRS, the security of IRS can be quantified. In general, the lower the threat index of IRS, the closer IRS is to the normal state, and the more secure IRS is. However, the above methods can only be used to answer whether IRS is in an abnormal state, but cannot tell which type of security threats IRS is suffering from. From the perspective of defense decision making, the rough results of these methods are not enough. Thus, this paper proposes a new security measurement method for IRS which is called state modeling and relevance calculation (SM-RC). Different from the above methods, this paper not only considers the similarity between the current state and the normal state (CNS) but also considers the similarity between the current state and the specific abnormal state (CAS). The threat index is calculated by the relevance of the two similarities. The key step of SM-RC is to model the normal state and the specific anomaly state of IRS. However, since the data labeled as abnormal is relatively rare, the use of a quantitative model to characterize a particular abnormal state has a VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ problem of low precision. Therefore, this paper proposes an IRS state modeling method based on the qualitative analysis of indicator changes.
II. SECURITY INDICATORS
In this section, we first analyze the statistical characteristics that can reflect changes in IRS security states, and further analyzes the patterns of these statistical characteristics under typical security events.
A. DEFINITION OF SECURITY INDICATORS
The current protocol for IRS is the BGP protocol [4] . The dynamic routing information exchange between the autonomous systems is implemented by exchanging BGP messages between neighboring BGP routers. BGP messages are classified into four categories: OPEN, UPDATE, KEEPALIVE, and NOTIFICATION. The UPDATE message is a type of BGP messages that carry incrementally transmits network reachability changes. In order to reduce the overhead of information transfer, a BGP router can simultaneously announce or withdraw multiple paths in an UPDATE message. When IRS is suffering from security threat, The change of network reachability will lead to frequent path announcements or withdrawals. Therefore, the following security indicators can be defined:
The number of UPDATE messages (N U ) is the number of UPDATE messages received in unit time.
Definition 2: The number of ANNOUNCE paths (N A ) is the number of new path announcements within the UPDATE message received in unit time.
Definition 3: The number of WITHDRAW paths (N W ) is the number of path withdrawals within the UPDATE message received in unit time.
Although changes of N U , N A , and N W can reflect changes in the operational state of IRS, they are not sufficient to provide a relatively comprehensive view of how security threats affect IRS. In fact, by observing the sequence of path changes for the same network prefix, more complex system operating modes can be captured. For example, observing the number of implicit withdrawals and explicit withdrawals can lead to new understandings of IRS's operating mode. Implicit withdrawal is a path withdrawal that announces different reachable paths to the same network prefix in succession. The BGP router implicitly tells the neighbor that the previous path is no longer used by path replacement. Explicit withdrawal is a path withdrawal that a BGP router notifies its neighbors to discard the previously announced path by directly sending an UPDATE message containing the WITHDRAW field. If the BGP router has multiple alternate paths, it can discard the old path by implicit withdrawal. When the alternate paths are unavailable too, the BGP router can only notify its neighbors by explicit withdrawal. In addition, path flapping occurs when the path re-announcement is followed by its withdrawal. Literature [5] and [6] consider path flapping to be a redundant path update. This kind of update can neither reflect the change of the topology nor the change of the routing strategy, and it is a pathological duplicate. This paper further defines three security indicators as follows:
Definition 4: The number of non-duplicate announcements (N AA ) is the number of announcements when the AS_PATH or NEXT_HOP fields are different in consecutive two announcements for the same prefix in unit time.
Definition 5: The number of explicitly withdrawals (N AW ) is the number of consecutive updates for the same prefix in the unit time, which the previous update is path announcement and the next is path withdrawal.
Definition 6: The number of route flapping (N WA ) is the number of consecutive updates for the same prefix, which the previous update is path withdrawal and the next is path announcement with the same fields of AS_PATH and NEXT_HOP.
B. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF CHANGES IN SECURITY INDICATORS
This section takes the security indicators as the analysis object, and analyzes the change of them when IRS suffering from different security threats. Two typical security threats are selected such as cable fault events [7] and route leak events [8] .
1) CABLE FAULT EVENT
The cable fault event is a multi-link failure event. Since the cable carries multiple IRS links, when the cable fails, multiple BGP sessions will be terminated at the same time. The BGP routers related to these BGP sessions will withdraw the paths learned from the opposite and attempt to calculate a new path for the affected prefix. In general, IRS will use the alternate path instead of the withdrawn path. However, the alternate paths are usually unavailable when cable fault occurs. As a result, a large number of paths are explicitly withdrawn, and N W and N AW are significantly increased. By analyzing the UPDATE message in the real world, it can be found that when BGP session is disconnected, the number of path withdrawals contained in an UPDATE message will be increased from the several to hundreds. So it is hard to judge whether or not N U is significantly increased. In addition, because a new available path cannot be announced until the failed cable is restored. Therefore, N A , N AA , and N WA will not change much.
2) ROUTE LEAK EVENT
A route leak event is an event in which prefixes are illegally announced. The propagation of these illegally announced prefixes in IRS results in more incorrect or sub-optimal paths. Route leak affects IRS in a similar way to prefix hijacking. The difference is that prefix hijacking is usually caused by malicious attacks, but route leak is usually caused by misconfiguration. During the propagation of illegal routes, a large number of newly announced illegal paths will replace the original legal paths, so N A and N AA will increase significantly. Packets that are forwarded along these illegal paths are often unable to reach the actual destinations, thus some BGP routers will withdraw the path to these prefixes, resulting in a significant increase in N W . However, after a while, the propagation of these actually incorrect/sub-optimal paths will again affect the BGP router, causing duplicate announcements of the actual incorrect/sub-optimal path, resulting in a signifi- In summary, qualitative analysis shows that the changes of security indicators under different security threats are not the same. In order to differentiate the security threats, two aspects should be portrayed:
• The magnitude of the change in the indicator, that is, the magnitude of the change in the indicator of the current state relative to the indicator of the normal state.
• The difference between the changes of security indicators to determine the relative magnitude of changes between security indicators. One example is that in the case of a route leak, N AA will have a large increase. However, this increase should still be less than the increase of N WA relative to the normal state.
III. SM-RC
The goal of the SM-RC is to reflect the likelihood of security threats by computing the threat index of IRS and to further reveal the types of security threats. Therefore, the SM-RC needs to comprehensively combine CNS and CAS. In terms of comprehensive evaluation, the ideal point method is the one that comprehensively considers the similarity between the object to be evaluated and the optimal or worst object. It can be divided into two steps, the first step is to find an optimal and a worst object, the second step is to calculate the relevance between the object to be evaluated and the optimal object or the worst object. The idea is that if an object is a preferred object, it should have a high similarity with the optimal object and a low similarity with the worst object. In our problem domain, the optimal object and the worst object are referred to the specific abnormal state of IRS and the normal state of IRS, respectively.
The precondition for using the ideal point method for system security measurements is to model the two ideal states of IRS. In MAF-SAM and I-Seismograph, cloud model theory [9] and classical statistical theory have been used to build system normal state models. For abnormal state modeling, researchers point out due to lack of labeled data, it's hard to build an accurate quantified model for different abnormality [10] . Therefore, SM-RC considers establishing a qualitative model for the IRS state, supporting qualitative analysis results of the security threat as input to abnormal state modeling. The analysis in Section II indicates that IRS security state modeling consists of two steps: one is to describe the change magnitude of the indicator, and the other is to describe the relative magnitude of changes. Since it is not practical to directly compare the values of the two indicators, it is necessary to pre-process the indicators to eliminate their incommensurability.
In summary, the overview of SM-RC are shown in Figure1, including security index extraction, data preprocessing, state modeling, threat index calculation, and threat type determination. Specifically,
• Security indicator extraction is mainly responsible for extracting security indicators from the original data.
• Data preprocessing is mainly responsible for converting the original indicators into the deviations from their normal value, so that the comparison between the preprocessed security indicators can reflect the difference of the relative change magnitude.
• State modeling can be divided into two parts: one is to use the preprocessed data as input to model the current state of IRS. The other is to use the qualitative analysis results of security threats as input to model the positive/negative ideal state of IRS.
• Threat index calculation is mainly responsible for calculating the correlation between the current state of IRS and the positive/negative ideal state of IRS to obtain the threat index.
• Threat type determination is mainly responsible take threat indices under different specific security threat types as input. Based on the largest component in the threat index vector, whether IRS is suffering from security threats and what the type of the security threat is can be determinated.
IV. DATA PREPROCESSING
According to the design of SM-RC, the original indicators should be converted into the deviations from their normal value. The comparison between the indicator data after preprocessing can still reflect the difference of the relative change magnitude. Let the security indicator data collected during stable operation of IRS is .
where y I i is the deviation from the indicator value x I i of the security indicator I i to its mean X I i , which is referred to the deviation from the value of security indicator I i to its mean. The data needs to be cleaned before calculating the deviation from the mean(DM). The first step is to exclude data from the period related to the known security threats, and the second step is to further clean the remaining data to filter the noise due to short-term instability. In the second step of preprocessing, the following assumptions can be made:
• In a relatively long period of time, IRS is in normal state for a longer period of time than it is in an abnormal state.
• If we take a security indicator value vector (
T as a point in the indicator space, then the vectors representing system's normal state should form a relatively close cluster. If IRS enters an abnormal state, then the corresponding points should be free from the normal cluster.
• The abnormal state usually manifests as a significant increase of x I i rather than a significant decrease. Based on the above assumptions, this paper uses the K-Medoids algorithm [11] to filter out short-term anomalies contained in the remaining data. The original data is clustered into two clusters. According to the previous assumption, the smaller cluster is the one composed of the separated shortterm abnormal points, so the larger cluster will be used to calculate the mean of the security indicator value.
V. IRS SECURITY MEASUREMENT AND THREAT TYPE DETERMINATION
In this section, we first proposes a system state qualitative modeling method based on the DM comparison matrix, which can simultaneously represent the change magnitude of each security indicator and relative change magnitude between the security indicators. Then, state solving method is given to obtain the system state and the state similarity calculating method is given to measure the similarity between states. By using relevance calculation, the threat index of IRS can be calculated. Finally, we can preset multiple ideal points (different specific abnormal states), and threat index vector of IRS can be calculated. Based on the maximum component of the threat index vector, whether there is a security threat and what the type of security threat can be determined.
A. SYSTEM STATE MODELING BASED ON DM COMPARISON MATRIX
According to the qualitative analysis of the changes of security indicators in Section II, two requirements for the specific anomaly state can be obtained. In fact, in qualitative analysis, the relative change magnitude of some security indicators is difficult to be determined, and the proposed state modeling method should handle such uncertainties. Thus, the state modeling method based on the DM comparison matrix is given as follows. Let the selected security indicators be I 1 , I 2 , . . . , I n , and the security state of IRS can be described by an n × n matrix A,
For a ij ∈ A, the meaning of a ij can be defined separately according to whether i, j are equal. Based on Definition 7 and Definition 8, the range of a ij is defined as u, d, −, * . The meanings of these values is given as:
Definition 9: Considering the situation that i = j. When a ii = u, it indicates that the value of security indicator I i is significantly increased relative to the mean of normal state. When a ii = d, it indicates that the value of security indicator I i is significantly reduced relative to the mean of normal state. When a ii = −, it indicates that there is no significant change of the value of security indicator I i . When a ii = * , it indicates that the change of the value of security indicator I i is arbitrary.
Definition 10: Considering the situation that i = j. When a ij = u, the DM of the security indicator I i is significantly increased compared to the DM of the security indicator I j ; when a ij = d, the DM of the security indicator I i is significantly reduced compared to the DM of the security indicator I j is significantly reduced; when a ij = −, the DM of the security indicator I i is not significantly different from the DM of the security indicator I j . When a ij = * , it is not clearly defined the difference between the DM of the security indicator I i and the DM of the security indicator I j .
According to Definition 7, the main diagonal part of the matrix A represents the changes of the security indicator value with respect to the mean of normal state. According to Definition 8, the remaining part of the matrix A indicates the comparison of DM of the different security indicators. It can be seen from Definition 9 and 10 that a ij can represent four qualitative relationships between two different security indicators such as the relative increase, the relative decrease, no significant relative change, and the relative change cannot be clearly defined.
According to the principle of symmetry, a ij and a ji are different representations of the same concept. For example, when a ij = u, the value of a ji should be d. Therefore, the redundant part of the matrix A can be removed and A is simplified as an upper triangular matrix.
B. STATE SOLVING AND SIMILARITY CALCULATING
On the basis of giving the state modeling method, the following two problems need to be solved. The first problem is how to translate the preprocessed data into a state matrix. Another problem is how to calculate the similarity between two states A and A . The state solving and similarity calculating methods are given below.
1) STATE SOLVING
The preprocessed security indicator vector at a certain time t is y two state A and A is
where c(a ij , a ij ) is a comparison operation defined on u, d, −, * . According to the qualitative analysis of the indicator changes, the ideal normal state of IRS can be regarded as the negative ideal point, which is denoted as 0 . In order to reveal the types of security threats, the possible security threats T 1 , T 2 , . . . , T m can be preset as candidate security threats, and the abnormal states corresponding to these security threats are regarded as positive ideal points, which are denoted as 1 , 2 , . . . , m . i is the positive ideal point of
. Let A t denote the state of IRS at time t, the threat index of IRS under the security threat T i at time t is the relevance between the similarity of A t and the negative ideal point 0 or the similarity of A t and the positive ideal point i , which can be expressed as
As can be seen from the definition of similarity,
According to Equation 8 , the range of the threat index C t,i is [0, 1]. Obviously, when the similarity between A t and i is 0, the threat index C t,i = 0; when the similarity between A t and 0 is 0, the threat index C t,i = 1. When IRS is in a normal state, the security indicators should not change significantly, and a VOLUME 7, 2019 general representation of 0 can be given as
For the state of IRS at time t, the threat index C t,i of each candidate security threat can be calculated by using Equation 8 , and finally the threat index vector C t = (C t,1 , C t,2 , · · · , C t,m ). max(C t ) represents the largest component in C t , and the corresponding security threat is T j . By using max(C t ), we can determine whether IRS is suffering from a security threat. According to the definition of the relevance according to Equation 8 , when max(C t ) > 0.5, a security threat is considered to be occurred. This is because when max(C t ) exceeds 0.5, there is a security threat T j of which the state of IRS is closer to the specific abnormal state j rather than the normal state 0 . According to the principle of maximum similarity, since T j has the highest threat index, the security threat that IRS suffers from is most likely T j .
VI. EXPERIMENT
In this section, two sets of experiments are designed to verify the validity of SM-RC, which correspond to two real IRS security events. To verify SM-RC threat detection and classification capability, we observe the change of the threat index vector over time. We also compare SM-RC with a selected security quantification method.
A. SETUP
We use the UPDATE message archive data [12] provided by Route Views as the input of SM-RC. The UPDATE message was collected by the route-views2 collecter located at the University of Utah. Route-views2 establishes a BGP neighbor relationship with a number of Vantage Points (VP). As a silent listening node, route-views2 only accepts UPDATE messages delivered by the VPs. The UPDATE message data is sliced every 5 minutes and the security indicators are extracted.
The IRS security event selected in Experiment 1 is the SMW-4 cable fault event [7] . The length of SMW-4 cable is approximately 19,000 kilometers and is the main Internet backbone between Southeast Asia, the Middle East, European and Indian subcontinent, along with IMEWET. The IRS security event selected in Experiment 2 is the Malaysia route leak event [8] . At 8:43 a.m. on June 12, 2015, Malaysia Telecom (AS4788) announced about 179000 prefixes to AS3549. The spread of these illegal prefix announcement caused a big impact on IRS in the next two hours. According to the monitoring data of BGPmon, from 8:43 to 10:38, the packet loss rate of the level3 network between London and Hong Kong increased significantly, and the round-trip delay of the target prefix increased and abnormal flapping occurred. Therefore, the time range from 8:40 p.m. to 10:40 p.m. was chosen as the occurrence period of the security threat.
In both of the two experiments, by using the data preprocessing method proposed in Section IV, the two-week security indicator sequences before the events' occurrence is selected to calculate the mean of each security indicator. The candidate security threats are cable fault and route leak, which are represented by T 1 and T 2 . According to the qualitative analysis of the security indicators in Section II, the positive ideal points 1 for T 1 and 2 for T 2 can be expressed respectively as
The negative ideal point is the normal state 0 . For each data fragmentation, we calculate their threat index vector separately, and judge whether IRS is suffering from a security threat and what the type of the security threat is. For the values of the thresholds γ 1 and γ 2 , consider several typical combinations of values including (0.05, 0.5), (0.1, 0.5), (0.2, 0.5), (0.1, 0.2). The smaller the γ 1 and γ 2 , the more stringent it is in determining whether the difference is significant. We choose MAF-SAM, a new method for the security quantification of inter-domain routing systems, to conduct comparative experiments. We implemented the method according to the description in literature [1] . MAF-SAM has two sets of key parameters; ω FAM , ω FWM , ω APL are weight parameters, which control the influence of sub-cloud membership on threat index; λ is the update rate which controls the update speed of the three weight parameters. The reference values of weight parameters are given in literature [1] , i.e., ω FAM = 0.4, ω FWM = 0.3, ω APL = 0.3. Since the literature does not give a reference value of λ, we choose λ equaling to 0, 0.25 and 0.5 as the input parameters. When λ = 0, the static weight parameters are used. As λ increases, the impact of membership calculations on ω is gradually increasing. Like SM-RC, we use two-week data before the event for generating the reverse clouds in MAF-SAM. 
B. SM-RC THREAT DETECTION AND CLASSIFICATION CAPABILITY VERIFICATION
The components of the threat index vector calculated by SM-RC are shown in Figures 2 and 3 , respectively. The subgraphs represent the change of the threat index vector over time using different threshold combinations. In the legend, the curves pos_c and pos_r respectively represent changes in the two components of the threat index vector, where pos_c corresponds to the threat index change of T 1 and pos_r corresponds to the threat index change of T 2 .
As shown in Figure 2 , the threat index of T 1 reached a maximum of 1 at 5:35 p.m., while the threat index of T 2 was less than 0.5. Therefore, it can be determined that IRS is suffering from a security threat at 5:35 p.m. Moreover, the type of security threat is cable fault. After 5:35 p.m., the threat index of T 1 drops rapidly. In the next 30 minutes, the threat index of T 2 is higher than the threat index of T 1 , but always less than 0.5. The possible cause is that the path flapping occurs due to the recovery of the paths after the cable is cut. The ideal point 2 corresponding to the T 2 is suitable for describing a large number of path announcements and path flapping, so the occurrence of this phenomenon is reasonable.
As shown in Figure 3 , the obvious changes of the threat indices were observed from 8:40 p.m. to 11:00 p.m., and the threat index of T 1 and the threat index of T 2 both changed significantly. In general, the threat index first rises rapidly and stays at a high level for about two hours, and finally falls rapidly. It is worth noting that the threat index has a small peak at 11 o'clock. Two curves both indicate that IRS has been compromised in about two hours. Moreover, with the parameter combination γ 1 = 0.1, γ 2 = 0.5 and γ 1 = 0.2, γ 2 = 0.5, the threat index of T 2 has reached the maximum value in 4 and 11 times respectively. The maximum threat index corresponding to T 2 indicates that a route leak event may have occurred.
In the two experiments, the evaluation of threat detection and threat type determination of SM-RC are shown in Table 2 and Table 3 , respectively. In evaluating the threat detection capabilities of the SM-RC, we selected three indicators to evaluate the results. The precision is the ratio of the number of data slices correctly detected by SM-RC to the number of data slices related to the security threat; the recall rate is the ratio of the number of data slices correctly detected by SM-RC to the number of all data slices labeled as abnormal by SM-RC; F1Score is a comprehensive evaluation function of precision and recall, which can be expressed as
When evaluating the threat type determination capabilities of SM-RC, we use precision as an indicator. The threat type determination precision is the ratio of the number of data slices correctly classified by SM-RC. We found that SM-RC's threat detection precision and threat type determination precision for SMW-4 cable fault event are both 100%, but false alarm appears when γ 1 = 0.2, γ 2 = 0.05. The precision of threat detection and threat type determination of SM-RC for Malaysian route leakage event decreases with the decrease of threshold γ 1 or γ 2 , while recall always maintains a high value. SM-RC has the best overall performance when the parameter combination is γ 1 = 0.1 and γ 2 = 0.5.
C. COMPARISON OF SM-RC AND MAF-SAM THREAT DETECTION ABILITY
The comparison of the quantified results of SM-RC and MAF-SAM is shown in Figure 4 . The SM-RC curve is the curve of max(C t ) regarding to t when γ 1 = 0.1, γ 2 = 0.5; The MAF_0, MAF_0.25 and MAF_0.5 curve respectively represent the threat index calculating by using MAF-SAM varying with t when using λ = 0, 0.25 and 0.5 as parameters.
Observing Figure 4 -(a), it can be found that the quantified results of MAF-SAM have large fluctuations before and after the event; while in Figure 4 -(b), the MAF-SAM threat index for λ = 0.25 or λ = 0.5 is less than 0.5 for the range from 8:50 to 10:25, which is a poor indication of the current state of the inter-domain routing system. Table 2 presents the evaluation of the detection capabilities of SM-RC and MAF-SAM with different parameters. It can be seen that SM-RC has both higher precision and recall than MAF-SAM. The possible reason is that the MAF-SAM method selects fewer indicators when modeling the normal state, and does not pay attention to the relative changes between the indicators. It is difficult to describe the normal state more comprehensively, which causes the MAF-SAM to be sensitive to noise. MAF-SAM does not rely on qualitative analysis of events, using λ to dynamically adjust sub-cloud weights to accommodate system state's changes. In the weight adjustment, λ keeps the weight close to the proportion of subcloud membership in the sum of all memberships. However, since the update of weights is relatively delayed, dynamic adjustment of weights will cause MAF-SAM to underestimate the threat index when the proportion changes repeatedly. In summary, the ideal state of different types of events is extracted as an ideal point for event analysis. The threat indices calculated based on these ideal points can reflect the evolution of the system state. Evolutionary process-based analysis can be used to perceive system security situational awareness. Moreover, the maximum component of the threat index vector can also be used to indicate whether IRS is suffering from security threat and what the type of the security threat is. It has higher threat detection capabilities than existing methods.
VII. RELATED WORK
Measuring the security of IRS is meaningful for comprehensively understanding the state of IRS. Therefore, some studies focus on the quantification of security between IRS.
Zhang et al. [2] proposed a method to quantify the impact of large-scale Internet security events on IRS, and further used this method to analyze 16 typical security events from 2002 to 2016 in subsequent work [2] . Guo et al. [3] introduced fuzzy theory into system security quantification and proposed a security measurement method based on the cloud model to quantify the security of IRS which can effectively distinguish the data plane and control plane anomalies. However, the above methods do not consider the influence of the anomaly state on the measurement result when measuring the security of IRS.
A number of related studies have been carried out on the detection of anomalies in IRS [13] . In terms of time series analysis, Mai et al. [14] and Prakash et al. [15] used wavelet analysis to analyze and detect BGP anomalies. Deshpande et al. [16] proposed an online BGP anomaly detection method that uses a generalized maximum likelihood ratio to compare real-time sequences with predicted results of the AR model to detect mutation points. In pattern recognition, Al-Musawi et al. [17] found that BGP messages have deterministic, reproducible and non-linear properties, and use RQA to detect BGP instabilities.
Some works focus on solving the problem of BGP's anomaly classification. Li et al. [18] proposed a classification method based on C4.5 decision tree, which uses Internet route forensics (IRF) framework to distinguish BGP events. In the subsequent work, Dou et al. [19] introduced a hierarchical clustering algorithm to enhance the IRF's capability. In addition, Al-Rousan and Trajković [20] proposed a BGP anomaly classification method based on support vector machine model and hidden Markov model, while Ćosović et al. [21] proposed a classification method based on NaïveBayes and Decision tree J48. They also consider the non-balance problem of data set in machine learning and use the resampling method to solve the problem [22] . Cheng et al. [23] , [24] proposed a BGP anomaly detection method based on multi-time windows. In their methods, the discrete wavelet transform is used to format the data. The data is then used to train the LSTM neural network. However, These methods are limited by the amount of labeled data [10] , and cannot quantify the security state of IRS.
The comparison between related works and our work is shown in Table 5 .
VIII. CONCLUSION
Perceived the security situation of IRS is of great significance for maintaining the stable operation of the Internet. The system security quantification can be used to describe the dynamic evolution of IRS's state and reveal the occurrence of security threats. The existing inter-domain routing system security quantification methods only consider the deviation between the current state and the normal state, and does not involve a specific abnormal state. The measurement result cannot distinguish different security threats.
In order to perceive security threats and reveal the type of the security threat, this paper proposes an IRS security measurement method called SM-RC based on abnormal state modeling. Based on the analysis of the security indicators when IRS is threatened by security threats, a system state modeling method based on the DM comparison matrix is proposed. Then, IRS's security can be quantified by calculating the relevance between CNS and CAS. Finally, by comparing the maximum component of the threat index vector, the occurrence of security threat and the type of the security threat can be determined. Experiments based on SEA-4 cable fault event and Malaysian route leak event show that SM-RC can accurately identify and classify security threats. In future work, we will continue to analyze other security events and extend the set of abnormal states. 
